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CoNSnTtITIONAL LAw-CENSORSHIP oF OBSCENE LITERATURE-
The right to a free expression of ideas, without interference from 
governmental authorities, is inherent in the very nature of a de-
mocracy.1 On the other hand, it is also clear that the greater interests 
of the state at large will conflict with certain forms of expression, and 
in such circumstances obviously the former must prevail. It is the 
purpose of this comment to discuss the constitutional limitations on the 
governmental suppression of literature on grounds of obscenity.2 
1 ". • • But when men have realized that time has upset many lighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own con-
duct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out. ••• " Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 630, 
40 S.Ct. 17 (1919). 
2 Although it is conceded that governmental powei:s to limit expression are not con-
lined solely to obscene literature, this comment will consider only the latter. 
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I. The Common Law Heritage 
The problem of requiring literary publications to conform to 
certain basic moral standards is not a modem one. Originally, the 
English common law courts imposed no criminal sanctions on the 
publication and distribution of obscene or lewd material.:~ Although 
disturbed by their inability to meet the situation, the early judges 
ruled against any criminal liability, on the ground that no adequate 
precedent could be found.4 It was pointed out that this was not 
properly a problem for the temporal courts, but rather for the ecclesi-
astical courts, which in their great concern with spiritual matters 
must necessarily possess power to punish obscenity. However, it be-
came increasingly evident that either the ecclesiastical courts had no 
jurisdiction over the matter, were not exercising it, or were doing so 
quite ineffectively. For it was not too long after the issue had first 
been presented to the English court" that it reversed itself. In Rex -v. 
Curl, 6 the Court of the King's Bench ruled that the publication of 
obscene matter was an offense against the Crown and must neces-
sarily be punishable in the common law courts. Thus was established 
the crime of obscene libel, which Blackstone in his Commentaries7 
later recognized as a part of the common law of England.8 That this 
common law criminal liability was carried over to the United States 
and still exists today seems clear,9 although for all practical purposes 
actions are now prosecuted in pursuance of appropriate statut~.10 It 
has never been contended that the protections of the First:11 and 
Fourteenth12 Amendments to the United States Constitution served 
to abolish these common law sanctions in this country.13 
. 
3Regina v. Read, Fort. 98, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (1707). 
4Jn Regina v. Read, Fort. 98, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (1707), it was argued that Le Roy 
v. Sir Charles Sedley, 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1663), :Iepresented authority for 
punishment of overt obscenity, but the court concluded that this decision :Iested on criminal 
assault and battery. 
"Regina v. Read, Fort. 98, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (1707). 
62 Strange 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727). 
7BucxST., CoMM., book IV, pp. 150-153. 
s See generally 2 W.HAP..TON, C=mrAL LA.w, 12th ed., §§1942-1946 (1932). 
9 Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 91 (1815); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 
17 Mass. 336 (1821); State. v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315 (1857). 
10 See note 14 infra. 
11 "Congress shall make no law :Iespecting an establishment of :Ieligion, or prohibiting 
the free e.xercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a :Iedress of griev~ 
ances." U.S. CoNsr., amend. I. 
12 " ••• nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law •••• " U.S. CoNsr., amend. XIV. 
13 See 2 Coor.BY, CoNsTrrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 883 (1927). 
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II. Under Modern Statutes 
Any fruitful consideration of effective restraint on obscene litera-
ture today must take into account prevalent state statutes and munici-
pal ordinances. These form the basis for all attempts at suppression 
of morally undesirable publications. Forty-seven of our states have 
statutes imposing criminal liability for the publication or distribution 
of obscene matter.14 New Mexico, the one state having no provision 
for the punishment of obscene publications, expressly empowers the 
municipalities to impose criminal sanctions.16 Even where state crimi-
nal provisions exist, it is common to find an overlapping enforcement, 
due to the presence of local ordinances.16 
A. Constitutionality of Provisions. The initial inquiry must be 
whether these statutory provisions run afoul of First Amendment 
protections of free speech, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
against infringement by the state.17 The concern here is not with 
the question of the validity of prior restraints on expression.18 This 
latter phase of the constitutional problem raised by these statutory 
14AJa. Code (1940) tit. 14, §373; .Arlz. Code Ann. (1939) c. 43, §3002; Ark. Stat. 
Ann. (1947) §41-2704; Cal. Penal Code (1949) §311; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 48, 
§217; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §8567; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 11, §711; Fla. Stat. 
Ann. (1944) §847.01; Ga. Code Ann. (1935) tit. 26, §6301; Idaho Code (1948) §18-4101; 
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935) c. 38, §468; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) c. 28, §§10-2804, 10-
2805; Iowa Code Ann. (1950) tit. 35, §725.4; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 21, 
§§1101, 1102; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §436.100; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 14, §106; Me. 
Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 121, §24; Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 27, §515; Mass. Laws Ann. 
(1952 Supp.) c. 272, §28 (§28C provides for proceedings against the book itself in order 
to determine obscenity); Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) §28.575; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) 
§617.24; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) tit. 11, §2288; Mo. Stat. Ann. (1953) §563.280; 
Mont. Rev. Code (1947) tit. 94, §3603; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 28, §921; Nev. Comp. 
Laws (1929) §10144; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 441, §§14, 17; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) 
§2:140-2; 39 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §1141; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) 
c. 14, §189; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) tit. 12, §2109; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) 
§2905.34; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 21, §1021; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §23-924; 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §4524; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 610, §13; S.C. 
Code (1952) tit. 16, §414; S.D. Code (1939) tit. 13, §1722; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 
1934) §11190; Tex. Penal Code Ann. (Vernon, 1952) art. 526; Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
tit. 76, c. 39, §1; Vt. Stat. (1947) tit. 41, c. 370, §8490; Va. Code (1950) tit. 18, §113; 
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) tit. 14, c. 6, §2459; W.Va. Code (1949) 
§6066; Wis. Stat. (1951) §351.38; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) §9-513~ 
lU N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) c. 14, §1812. 
16 See, e.g., Municipal Code 0£ Chicago (1929) §192-9; Municipal Code, City 0£ 
Detroit (1945) c. 185, §1; The Pittsburgh Municipal Digest (1938) §733. 
17 In ensuing portions 0£ this comment, references will be made to First Amendment 
protections. It should be noted that where state or local action is considered, these protec-
tions are referred to as they are mirrored by the due process clause 0£ the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
ts Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). But see 49 CoL. L. REv. 
1001 (1949). 
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provisions will be considered later.19 Yet it must be recognized that 
the protection accorded by the First Amendment is more than a mere 
limitation on prior restraint. From a practical standpoint, in fact, 
. the more significant safeguard is the establishment of limits beyond 
which the states may not even impose subsequent punishment for 
expression. However, it seems to be conceded that obscene utterances 
are not within this area of privileged expression.20 If the matter truly 
qualifies as obscenity, the First Amendment will not preclude state 
or local punishment. 
Like all criminal statutory provisions, obscenity statutes and ordi-
nances must conform to the constitutional requirement . of lucidity. . 
If the provision is too vague to apprise potential violators of the nature 
of the prohibited action, the Fourteenth Amendment will invalidate 
it as a denial of due process. Although it might be thought that 
statutes or ordinances imposing criminal sanctions on obscenity are 
peculiarly subject to such attack, the Supreme Court has never ruled 
that such provisions are not sufficiently clear.21 It would probably be 
concluded that the common law crime of obscene libel22 has laid a 
sufficiently clear foundation for the validity of the statutory crime.28 
B. Application of Provisions. The application of the obscenity 
laws to specific cases has, by and large, resulted in no clear line of 
authority as to what will qualify as "obscene."24 Although the uncer-
tain application of these statutory provisions bears a theoretical relation-
ship to the constitutional question of whether the provisions are void 
10 See part 11-C of this comment, infra. 
20 " ••• There are certain well-denned and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional 
problem. These mclude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the h"'belous, and the insulting 
or 'lighting' words-those which by their very utterance inffict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace." Chaplmsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 571, 62 
S.Ct. 766 (1942). See also New York v. Doubleday, 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E. (2d) 6 
(1947), affd. per curiam, 335 U.S. 848, 69 S.Ct. 79 (1948). 
21Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 17 S.Ct. 375 (1897); Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); New York v. Doubleday, 297 N.Y. 687, 77 
N.E. (2d) 6 (1947), affd. per curiam, 335 U.S. 848, 69 S.Ct. 79 (1948). 
22 See treatment of common law liability in part I of this comment. 
23 ''The impossibility of denning the precise line between permissible uncertamty in 
statutes caused by describing crimes by words well understood through long use in the 
criminal law-obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting-and the unconstitu-
tional vagueness that leaves a person uncertam as to the kind of prolnoited conduct-
massmg stories to incite crime-has resulted in three arguments of this case in this Court. ••• " 
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 at 518, 68 S. Ct. 665 (1947). 
24 See Alpert, "Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature," 52 HAnv. L. REv. 40 
(1938). See also the opinion in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949). 
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for vagueness,25 the courts in resolving the latter question in favor of 
the validity of the provisions would not likely be bothered by the 
inconsistencies in the varying tests utilized in the application of the 
penal sanctions. 
The earliest test of obscenity was enunciated in the celebrated 
opinion in Regina 11. Hicklin.26 There, Chief Justice Cockburn stated 
that the test of obscenity is " ... whether the tendency of the matter 
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those w~ose minds are 
open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication 
of this sort may fall."21 Although lip service has apparently been paid 
to this standard in the United States,28 other decisions have indicated 
a preference for a narrower definition.29 It has been pointed out 
that a test of obscenity as broad as that formulated by Justice Cock-
burn would include many of the classics, since certain passages might 
serve to corrupt the mind of the pervert, which is seemingly the stand-
ard that the test imposes.30 As a further departure from the early 
English doctrine, there has developed a line of cases concluding that 
books or pamphlets the purpose of which is to further sex education 
are not "obscene."31 This latter development perhaps paved the way 
for the famous "Ulysses" decision.32 In the federal district court 
opinion in that case, Judge Woolsey concluded that in order to qualify 
as "obscene" a publication must be "dirt for dirt's sake."33 This doctrine 
would leave outside the sphere of punishable matter any work rep-
resenting a laudable purpose on the part of the author, regardless of 
2G This is treated in part II-A of this comment. 
2a L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). 
2'l'Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 at 371 (1868). 
2s United States v. Bennett, (2d Cir. 1879) 16 Blatchf. 338; Rosen v. United States, 
161 U.S. 29, 16 S.Ct. 434 (1896). See also 81 A.L.R. 801 (1932). 
29 St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 64 Misc. 336, 118 N.Y.S. 582 (1909); Halsey v. The 
New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 136 N.E. 219 (1922); United 
States v. Dennett, (2d Cir. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 564; United States v. One Book Entitled 
"Contraception," (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 525. 
ao See generally, Em.ST AND SBAcLE, To nm PtIIIB ••• (1929); ERNST AND l.nmBY, 
Tim CENsoa MARmms ON (1940). 
a1 United States v. Dennett, (2d Cir. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 564; United States v. One 
Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 821; United States 
v. One Book Entitled "Contraception," (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 525. See also 76 
A.L.R. 1099 (1932). 
32 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," (D.C. N.Y. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 182, 
affd. (2d Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 705. 
33 " ••• In many places it seems to me to be disgusting, but although it contains, as 
I have mentioned above, many words usually considered dirty, I have not found anything 
that I consider to be dirt for dirt's sake . ... " United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 
(D.C. N.Y. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 182 at 184, affd. (2d Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 705. 
580 MICHIGAN LAw Ravmw [Vol. 52 
his medium of expression. Such a test of obscenity certainiy represents 
a significant departure from the test first formulated by Justice Cock-
burn. In any event, it has received support in recent years.34 
C. Constitutionality of Enforcement Methods. Probably the most 
significant constitutional question raised by statutory provisions im-
posing criminal sanctions on the publication or distribution of obscene 
literature relates to the methods utilized in the enforcement of these 
provisions. Certainly the proper state or local authorities are em-
powered to initiate prosecutions for alleged violations of these obscenity 
laws, and no meritorious question can be raised as to the constitu-
tionality of such action. Common law civil actions of course remain 
as a limitation on the abuse of such processes.35 However, serious 
questions arise from a consideration of action taken by officers before 
prosecution, with restraint of embryonic violation as its purpose. 
In a recent federal district court case, New American Library of 
World Literature 11. Allen,36 the enforcement officer3' sent to the local 
distributors of a large publishing house lists of those books which he 
considered violative of a municipal ordinance imposing criminal sanc-
tions on the distribution and sale of obscene literature. This action 
amounted to a threat of prosecution, the purpose of which was to 
remove the questionable books from the publisher's outlet in that 
S4 United States v. Levine, (2d. Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 156; Walker v. Popenoe, (D.C. 
Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 511. Although only a few courts will go so far as to sustain a 
publication on the sole ground that it is written with a sincere purpose, others have been 
influenced by the "Ulysses" decision in decreeing a standard more liberal than that 0£ the 
earlier cases. See Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. (2d) 840 (1945); 
People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 959, 178 P. (2d) 853 (1947); Commonwealth v. 
Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949) (extensive discussion 0£ the history 0£ the application 
0£ obscenity provisions), affd. 166 Pa. SUPer. 120, 70 A. (2d) 389 (1950). See also 
ERNST AND l.mDEY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON 20-24 (1940); Alpert, "Judicial Censor-
ship 0£ Obscene Literature," 52 HAnv. L. REv. 40 (1938), where the author suggests that 
the difficulties which application 0£ the obscenity laws engender might best be obviated by 
the elimination 0£ all criminal sanctions against "obscene literature." 
35 Halsey v. The New York Society for the Suppression 0£ Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 136 
N.E. 219 (1922). 
as (D.C. Ohio 1953) 114 F. Supp. 823. 
87 In American ,Mercury v. Chase, (D.C. Mass. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 224, the court 
enjoined the Boston Watch and Ward Society from threatening the plaintiff magazine with 
prosecution i£ they did not suppress certain publications which that organization deemed 
morally undesirable. In reaching its decision, the court treated the Society as an unofficial 
organization, and the decision has been noted on that basis. 75 Umv. P.A. L. REv. 258 
(1926); 25 MICH. L. REv. 74 (1926). But the question under consideration here might 
have been reached i£ it had been impressed upon the court that a closer scrutiny 0£ that 
Society's function would show it to be, in effect, an agent 0£ municipal authorities. See 
CHAP:EE, THE !NQOIRING MmD 136-140 (1928). 
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municipality. After deciding that the ordinance in question was con-
stitutional, the court concluded that the circulation of the lists was 
outside the statutory authority of the officer in question.38 As a result, 
the publishing house was granted an injunction restraining the local 
officer from pursuing this means of intimidation. It would seem that 
this interpretation is quite narrow- especially in light of the common 
practices of governmental authorities in the enforcement of criminal 
provisions in general. Certainly it is a rare, and perhaps inefficient, 
penal officer who is not well-informed on potential criminal violations, 
and who at the same time does not seek to restrain their commission 
through personal contact with the potential violator. Yet such a narrow 
determination of the powers of the officer enforcing obscenity laws 
can probably be explained by the courts' justifiable reluctance to give 
sanction to anything that might appear to be, or even form the basis 
for, a prior restraint on expression. Here is reached the crux of the 
problem of censorship of obscene literature. 
The determination that it is not within the enforcement powers of 
governmental officers to threaten prosecution of distributors who con-
tinue to handle stipulated literary works of course obviates considera-
tion of any constitutional question relating to freedom of expression. 
But if it were determined that such action on the part of these officers 
is authorized, the question immediately becomes paramount, is this 
a prior restraint on expression? And if so, is it a denial of due process, 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment? 
At the outset, it would seem that the circulation of such lists by 
penal officers does not constitute on its face a restraint on expression. 
The publishers or distributors may or may not conform to these lists. 
A failure to do so will bring about no results other than those which 
would follow were no lists distributed, viz., prosecution under the 
appropriate obscenity provision. Yet it seems reasonably clear that a 
distribution of such lists has an effect independent of that provided by 
a later prosecution. Relatively small distributors might suppress cer-
tain literary works for fear of prosecution, and this fear would be all 
the more aggravated when the authorities have indicated the certainty 
of a criminal proceeding in the event of non-compliance with the 
distributed lists.39 To say that such a power, were it to fall into the 
38 For a like determination on an identical issue, see Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. 
Super. 292, 96 A. (2d) 47 (1953). The court there went on to point out that the action 
by the officer also constituted an unconstitutional fonn of censorship. 
39 See CHAPEE, F.REB SPEECH m 'I'B:E UNITBD SrATES 536-540 (1941). 
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hands of those who might abuse it, would be a dangerous one is to 
voice the obvious. It is therefore submitted that the power to circulate 
such lists, as a mode of enforcement of the obscenity laws, does in 
effect constitute a prior restraint.40 
The final question which must be considered is whether or not 
a previous restraint on obscene publications is rendered invalid by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as it incorporates ~e. First Amendment.41 
The doctrine that although the First Amendment does not preclude 
punishment for some forms of eJ>,.'Pression it does operate to limit the 
power of the states and municipalities to impose prior restraints on 
expression finds its most famous pronouncement in the case of Near 11. 
Minnesota.42 In that case, however, the Supreme Court did suggest 
two possible situations where a valid prior restraint might exist. These 
the Court referred to when it said: "The objection has also been made 
that the principle as to immunity from previous restraint is stated too 
broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is 
undoubtedly true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not 
absolutely unlimited . . . . On similar grounds, the primary require-
ments of decency may be enforced against obscene publications .... "43 
The Court seems to have meant that a prior restraint is permissible 
when the expression would constitute a "clear and present danger." 
The Court has never since been called upon to determine if a prior 
restraint on obscenity is valid.44 That it might follow this casual 
remark in Near 11. Minnesota is possible. But it would seem that before 
the Court would sanction prior censorship of obscene literature, it 
would demand extremely definite standards for determining what 
would constitute obscenity-a requirement which appears quite difficult 
to meet.45 
Donald M. Wilkinson, Jr., S.Ed. 
40lbid. 
41 See Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A. (2d) 47 (1953). 
42283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). 
43 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 at 715, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). The fust possibility 
the Court recognized was that expression which. would have an adverse effect on the 
security of the nation could be restrained by the government during time of war. 
44 In striking down a municipal ordinance which made a license a prerequisite to the 
distribution of literature, the Court noted: " ••• The ordinance is not limited to 'literature' 
that is obscene or offensive to public morals or that advocates UDlawful conduct. • • ." 
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 at 451, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1937). But see Bantam 
Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A. (2d) 47 (1953); Cs:A.PEB, Frum SPEECH IN 
TRa UNm!D STATES 536-540 (1941). 
45 See CRAP.tm, Frum SPEECH IN nm UNIT.BD STATES 536-540 (1941). 
